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THE POLCAL ECONOMY OF U.S.
EXPORT SUBSIDIES FOR WHEAT
ABSTRACT
During 1985-93 the U.S. Government provided $4.9 billion in subsidies to targeted foreign
buyers of U.S. wheat under its Export Enhancement Program (EEP). The subsidies averaged $31
per metric ton, or about 25 percent of the U.S. price. The EEP generates a small gain to U.S.
farmers, compared to its costs. Lacking a clear economic justification, the debate on the EEP
indicates the following were the key factors in its political success: farmers and agribusiness have
been unified in support of the program, and have excellent political channels through which to
express their views; domestic users of wheat have not opposed the program; and the program
received an initial boost because of its use of large government-owned wheat stocks, allowing
it to be treated as budget neutral in Congress. An economic argument that canied political
weight was that the EEP, by increasing the costs of the European Community's wheat export
subsidies, would encourage them to negotiate joint U.S./EC subsidy reductions. In fact, the EC
in 1993 did agree to multilateral subsidy reductions in the GAiT, as well as reforming their own
policies unilaterally. But it remains questionable whether this outcome justifies the EEP.
Bruce L. Gardner
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat*
U.S. agricultural commodities are predominantly exported rather than imported, but border
price distortions for the exported commodities nonetheless exist, in the form ofexport subsidies.
This paper investigates the economics and politics ofexport subsidies for the commodity where
these subsidies are most important, wheat, and focuses on the Export EnhancementProgram
initiated in 1985.
Background:AricuItural Price Support Programs
Systematic programs to support agricultural commodity prices date from the initial New
Deal legislation of 1933. Wheat was one of the original "basic" commoditiessupported (the
others were Cotton, corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk)! Wheat continues to beone of the most
heavily supported coniniodities. Table I ShOWS estimates of naners to producers of wheat and
other commodities during 1984-87, our period of primary concern. Wheat fareswell,
with $3.25 billion in estimated net gains (producers' surplus) annually, 48percent of the market
value of wheat.
Rye, flax, barley, grain sorghum, cattle, peanuts and sugar (beets and cane) were added in
1934. The only important commodities excluded were poultry andeggs, soybeans, forage crops,
fruits and vegetables. A useful, detailed discussion of agricultural policy in the 1930s is Benedict
(1953).Table 1. Estimated annual gains from commodity programs: 1984-87
(I) (2) (3) (2)÷(3)
Number Producers' Market Value Protection
of gains of Crop rate
Producers ($ million) ($ million)
(thousands)
wheat 352 3,250 6,770 .48
Corn 6.27 4,200 16,550 .25
soybeans 442 410 10,520 .04
rice 12 460 870 .53
COttOn 43 680 3,580 .19
tobacco 137 360 2,310 .16
sugar crops 9 610 1,670 .36
peanuts 19 820 1,080 .76
milk 202 1,450 18,200 .08
Sources: (I) U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1987, Vol, 1, Part 51: (2) Lin and Gardner (1988); (3)
USDA, Agricultural Statistics, 1992.
2The means of supporthavebeenpredominantly domesticmarket
interventions—government purchases, supply controls, payments to producers—but border
measures have inevitably been required to maintain U.S. prices above corresponding world
market levels. Commodities imported into the United States —sugar,citrus juices, dairy
products, wool, meats —areprotected by means of tariffs or quantitative restrictions on imports.
But a substantially greater volume of U.S. agricultural output is exported (Figure 1), causing
greater difficulty for domestic price Support.
Attempts have been made to explain the economic and political forces that result in
agricultural price supports generally, and the political economy of differences between the support
provided for different commodities. Explanations have focussed on political factors such as the
long tenure of mostly rural Southern committee chairmen in Congress, the fact that rural areas
are more than proportionally represented in the Senate, and general sympathy for farm people
among the nonfarm population (see Benedict, 1953; Hardin, 1968; Bonnen and Browne (1989),
Rapp (198%), Browne, et. al. (1992)).
In Gardner (1987), I attempt to explain differences between commodities in the level of
support granted. There is not clear evidence that having either a small or large number of
producers or being geographically concentrated or dispersed, makes much difference in the degree
of protection. But it helps a commodity's political prospects significantly to be an imported
product and to have experienced a recent price decline. And it harms a product's prospects to
be highly elastic in both supply or demand (making it difficult for either production controls or
subsidies to transfer a large amount to producers without generating relatively large deadweight










































































































































































 unexplained. Further progress in understanding U.S. agricultural protection may well require
more detailed investigation of particular commodity policies.
Wheat trade and the wheat program. Immediately following WorldWarHwheatexports
became a large component of the demand for U.S.wheat(Figure 2). In 1950, 35 percent of
production was exported, and ovr half the crop has been exported in 1980-1993. At the same
time, wheat prices have been seen by producers as generally too low throughout the postwar
period. These concerns have been politically potent enough to maintain Depression-era wheat
program mechanisms in place to the present. The new element in the 1950s was the importance
of the export market, and the problems and opportunities this posed for the wheat price-support
program.
The traditional means of price support is a governmental agreement, through its
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), to buy wheat at the support price. This program
periodically led to governmental acquisition of large stocks which were costly to store and for
which markets did not exist at the support price level. Three main policy instruments have been
on the agenda for solving the surplus commodity problem: subsidized sales abroad; acreage
reduction programs; and permitting market prices to fall while compensating producers with
"deficiency" payments when the market price falls below a legislated target price.
In post-World War II wheat policy, subsidized sales abroad were the first approach tried.
Continued foreign donations of wheat were a natural follow-up to the Marshall Plan. They were
systematized in the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954 (known as P.L. 480 and,



















































































































































 exports were subsidized in the framework of the International Wheat Agreement, under general
authority given the Secretary of Agriculture in the 1930s. The subsidy ranged from 5to30
percent of the price of wheat, depending on world and U.S. market conditions in each year. The
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (Section 22) gave the President authority, strengthened in
the Agricultural Act of 1948, to impose import quotas if imports threatened the effectiveness of
any price-support program.2
In the mid-1950s it became apparent that food aid and subsidized commercial exports
were insufficient to dispose of U.S. wheat surpluses. Acreage allotments, a feature of the 1930s
programs, were re-introduced in 1954, and reduced planted acreage by about l million acres
(from 79 million in 1953 to an average of 61 million in 1954-56). Each producer had to stay
under the farms allotment in order to be eligible for price-support loans. In 1956 the Soil Bank
program was introduced. It paid wheat growers about $20 per acre (roughly market rental rates)
to idle an average of 12 million more acres (20 percent of pre-program acreage) in 1956-58.
In 1964 the approach of letting price supports fall, with compensating payments to
producers, was inni)duced. The support price was cut essentially to the world market-clearing
level, with the idea of reducing CCC stocks and the need for export subsidies. At the same time,
payments were made to guarantee higher farmer receipts for that fraction of the wheat crop sold
domestically. Each producer received a "domestic allotment' for purposes of calculating this
payment.
2Small quantities of wheat imports were grandfathered in by a lower limit of the wheat import
quota at 50 percent of the quantity imported in a base period determined by the President. The
wheat imports shown in figure 2 are from Canada. Section 22 quotas were suspended by
Executive Order in 1974, but a recent increase in U.S. imports of Canadian wheat has led to calls
for their re-imposition.
7Acreage idling, payments, and export subsidiesallremained in place until the commodity
boom that erupted with the large Soviet wheat purchases of July 1972. During 1973-76 market
prices were well above support levels. The conflation of Soviet purchases, the oil shock, income
growth in food importing countries, and accelerating U.S. inflation convinced many that a
watershed had been crossed that meant an end to the era of agricultural surpluses. Acreage
reduction programs were abandoned and farmers were encouraged, in the Secretary of
Agriculture's phrase, to plant fencerow to fencerow. The Nixon Administration went so far as
to replace export subsidies by quantitative limitations on exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union in 1974-76.
By late 1976 the boom mentality had begun to fade, for wheat before any other major
crop. In October 1976 President Ford, at the urging of Senator Dole and others, raised the CCC
loan rate for wheat from $1.37 to $2.25 per bushel. President Carter was confronted within a
year of taking office by a tractoreade, led by wheat growers, that resulted in legislation that
resurrected the traditional wheat policy instruments. However, sustained intervention on the pre.
1972 scale did not reappear until the mid-1980s. See table 2 for a summary of indicators.
The remainder of this paper will focus on events before and after the reintroduction of
export subsidies in the Export Enhancement Program (EEP), initiated in 1985 and still
functioning. The discussion will consider: the economics of EEP and alternative interventions
in 1985, the interest group mobilization that caused the EEP to succeed politically, the arguments
employed and the political channels used.Finally, there will be an assessment of the
consequences of the program.
8Table 2: Wheat Policy Instruments, 1960-1990
Government Government Acreage
Crop Inventory Payments Diversion
Year (Mu. Bu.) (Mi!. dol.) (Mi!. acres)
1960 1280 0 0
1961 1134 0 10.2
1962 1111 286 10.7
1963 839 243 7.1
1964 646 443 5.1
1965 343 509 7.1
1966 132 681 8.2
1967 102 727 0
1968 163 746 0
1969 301 856 11.0
1970 378 871 15.7
1971 380 886 13.5
1972 155 859 20.1
1973 19 478 7.3
1974 I 102 0
1975 0 5! 0
1976 0 143 0
1977 390 1157 0
1978 454 719 9.6
1979 448 72 8.2
1980 560 228 0
1981 750 635 0
1982 1253 489 5.8
1983 799 1080 30.0
1984 1032 1556 18.4
1985 1198 2208 18.8
1986 1462 3673 21.0
1987 750 3290 28.1*
1988 477 1686 29.6*
1989 267 724 18.4*
1990 177 2420 17.8*
1991 202 2245 26.0*
1992 178 1370
Source:USDA, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
*Includeswheat base placed in the Conservation Reserve Program under 10-year contracts (10.6
million acres in 1992).
9Origins of the Export Enhancement Program
Agricultureingeneral faced severe economic problems in the early 1980s. The problems
are apparent in the data on farm income and the farm sector's balance sheet. Real farm income
(including government assistance) in 1980-84 averaged about half its level in 1971, before the
commodity boom (figure 3). The USDAs estimate of farm equity, the value of farm assets minus
liabilities, declined from $1. trillion (1987 dollars) on January 1, 1979 to one-third of that value,
$0.6 trillion on January I, 1985.
With respect to wheat growers more specifically there are no data on income or equity
value, but an indication that is particularly useful in political terms can be obtained from state-
level statistics. Kansas and North Dakota are the two most important wheat states, the centers
of the winter and spring wheat growing areas, respectively. Together they account for about 30
percent of U.S. wheat acreage. Within these states, 46 percent of Kansas cropland and 45 percent
of North Dakota cropland is planted to wheat, In both states, real farm equity declined sharply
after 1979 (figure 4), at about the same rate as in the nation as a whole. Figure 5 shows the real
price of cropland in Kansas and the United States, again both declining sharply.
These indicators are sufficient (but perhaps not necessary )conditionsto explain cries of
economic pain from the wheat growers. The Wheat Program as revised in the Agriculture and
Food Act of 1981 involved considerable government efforts to assist wheat producers. The price
paid to farmers for wheat placed in government ownership was increased to $4.00 per bushel for
the 1982 crop. It had been only $1.37 up to 1975. U.S. wheat acreage planted expanded 45%,
from $59 million acres in 1973 to 86 million acres in 1982, and USDA increased its wheat stocks
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1970 1910to over a billion bushels in 1982, the highest level since the early 1960s. In reaction, the
Payment in Kind (P1K) program was introduced and idled 30 million acres of wheat base in
1983, the largest supply control effort ever. In 1984, direct payments to wheat growers roseto
exceed $1.5 billion. Yet none of these measures was capable of stemming the decline in income
and equity values through 1985.
Underlying economic situation. The supply-demand situation is sketched in figure 6.
Production in 1985 is shown as the vertical line S85. While well above mid-1970s levels,
production in 1985 was only slightly higher thanthe 2.38billion bushels of 1980. The notable
change in market conditions is on the demand side, where 2.3 billion bushels cleared the market
at $3.99 a bushel in 1980, while 1.96 billion bushels sold for only $3.08 (nominal) in 1985. The
demand curves sketched in show the magnitude of demand reduction that occurred, and the
separate demand function shown for U.S. exports indicates reduction in demand is accounted for
entirely by a decline in the foreign demand for U.S. wheat. Exports declined by 40 percent
despite lower U.S. prices in 1985 than in 1980.
Several econometric investigations were undertaken in the early 1980s to explain U.S.
wheat exports, e.g. Gallagher et al. (1981), Sharples (1982), USDA (1985). Other studies have
been conducted since that time, but the ones cited indicate the informational basis for policy
decisions in 1985. Two factors received most of the blame for the decline in export demand:
the strong dollar and the agricultural policies of the European Community (EC). Between 1980
3Although a point is plotted at the market price of $3.08 and 2.42 billion bushels on S, this
is not a point on a supply curve in the usual sense. The market price is not the incentive price
for production, because producers also receive deficiency payments and because producers held
18.8 million acres of wheat land idle in order to qualify for deficiency payments. The underlying
market supply curves for 1985 is somewhere to the right of S,5 for prices above $3.
14FIGURE 6.
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0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5and l95 the dollar rose 17 percent against the Canadian dollar and more than doubled against
the French franc, the principal alternative sources of wheat in world trade. The overall trade-
weighted value of the U.S. dollar rose about 60 percent. An exchange rate weighted by wheat
export market shares rose 50 percent over this period (Dutton and Grennes).This means that the
apparent fall of 25 percent in the dollar price of wheat between 1980 and1985 was actually a
rise of about that much relative to competing sellers in terms of the buyers' currencies.
EC policies in this period were a conunuatlon of those in effect since the l960s under the
Common Agricultural Policy(CAP) of the EC. Wheat prices received by producers in the EC
have averaged about double the U.S. farm price. The main means of protection is a variable
import levy, a tariff adjusted weekly to make up the difference between world prices and the
protected ("threshold") price level in the EC. In 1985 the levy varied between 57 and 140ECU's
($64 and $175) per metric ton, 40 to 110 percent of the world (Rotterdam) average price. This
mechanism provides EC farmers with a price that is not only high but also stable.
Behind this protective wall EC wheat production expanded steadily, despite a limited land
area. Between 1969-71 and 1989-91 the wheat area of Western Europe (including 4.0 million
hectares outside the EC in 1970 but now in) increased from 17.1 to 17.6 million hectares, a little
over half the U.S. wheat area. Yield per hectare, however, increased more sharply, from 2.7 to
5.1 metric tons per hectare, a rate of growth of over 3 percent annually. Over this period U.S.
wheat yields grew at a rate of about 0.5 percent annually. By 1989-91 U.S. yields were a little
less than half of European yields. EC yields grew not so much through genetic improvements
as through increasing and increasingly sophisticated use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.
16EC production methods have been tried in humid areas of the U.S., and have doubled yields
there, butaretoo costly to be profitable at U.S. wheat prices.
The result in trade is that the EC moved from self-sufficiency in wheat in 1970 to being
a net exporter of about 25 percent oi' its production in the mid-l980s, making the EC the second-
largest wheat exporter in the world. These exports are accomplished in the face of EC internal
prices well above world-trading prices by means of export subsidies. These subsidies in the mid-
1980s were $0$l0() per metric ton of wheat, bringing the EC price from $230-250 internally
to a $140-160 world level (Rotterdam basis), and costing the EC budget $l.0-$l.5 billion
annually in 1980-85.
Between 1979/81 and 1984/86, EC annual wheat exports increased about 5 1/2 million
metric tons. This amounts to 200 million bushels, one-third of the U.S. wheat export decline
between 1980 and 1985.
Overall, it appears plausible (from the perspective of 1994 as well as that of 1985) that
the combination of the high value of the dollar and EC subsidies accounted for much and quite
possibly all of the decline in U.S. wheat export demand during the early l980s. With an
elasticity of foreign demand for U.S. wheat of -1.5, a 25 percent real price increase would reduce
U.S. wheat exports by about 500 million bushels. Together with the 200 million bushel EC
export gain being shared proportionally by export losses of the U.S. and other wheat exporters,
one can explain a decline of about 600 million bushels, which is the entire 1980-1985 actual loss.
Another factor that received much attention in 1981-85 was the role of U.S. wheat policy,
particularly the high prices paid for grain entering the Farmer-Owned Reserve and acreage
controls, especially the reduction of 16.5 million acres of wheat harvested that occurred in 1983
17under the Payment iii Kind (P1K) program. Under this program U.S. wheat production fell by
350 million bushels in 1983, a reduction of 13 percent from 1982. This would be expected to
causea reductionin U.S. wheat exports; but at the same time Farmer-OwnedReservestocks were
reducedby 450 million bushels—the payment in kindwas inthe form of CCC stocks. So it is
not clear that the P1K program reduced exports (or propped up world prices to the benefit of the
EC). But is clear that the combination of high loan rates and supply management during 1981-85
held wheat prices (U.S. and world) above the levels to which they would otherwise have fallen.
Since the 25 percent rise in the value of the dollar could have been offset by a 25 percent fall
inthe U.S. wheat price,itis anoversimplification topointto the value of the dollar but not U.S.
pricesupports asa causeof thewheatexport slump.
Political Situation in1980-85
Theeconomic problems of administering thewheatprograminvolvednot only export
demand but also CCC stock accumulation as demand fell, and serious fmancial difficulties of
farmers, stemminglargelyfrom borrowing heavily at high interest rates to buy land at the high
prices of 1979-8 I. So it is not obvious that wheat growers would have concentrated upon the
export market as the principal source of their problems, or export subsidies as a plausible remedy.
Nonetheless, there was a heavy emphasis on wheat export issues by all the interested groups:
farmers,agribusiness, economic analysts, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Congress. The
main political decision points are listed inTable3.
In 1983 the Reagan Administration, at the urging of Secretary of Agriculture John Block,
afterdebatesettled only at the Cabinet level, accepted theideaof ad hoc subsidized exports of
18Table 3. Events in the Political History of the Export Enhancement Program
1. 1983 Reagan Administration cabinet, responding to wheat grower requests to
USDA, authorizes the use of CCC stocks to subsidize certain wheat
exports.
2. April-May 1985
In an agreement between the Reagan Administration and Senate
Agriculture Committee bipartisan leadership, the EEP is formally
established and publicly announced as an ongoing in-kind export subsidy,
with $2 billion in CCC stocks to be used for this purpose.
3. October-Dec. 1985
TheEEP is incorporated in the 1985 Farm Act.
4. October 1991)
The EEP is reauthorized by Congress, and supplemented by a "GAiT
trigger" that reinforces and expands EEP in the event no GAiT agreement
is reached.
5. Dec.2993GATT agreement reached which requires reduction in EEP and in the ECs
export subsidies.
19CCC-owed wheat totargetedNorth African markets whereEC wheat was being sold with the
helpoftheir exportsubsidies. Thiswasintendedtoservethe dualpurpose of reducing excessive
stock levelsand smiting the EC. This venture wasa substantial political success, affordingan
opportunity to attack the EC, please farmers, and hold off Congressional pressure fur more
sweeping programs. The impetus was thus established that led eventually to the full-fledged
Export Enhancement Program.
In Congress, the idea of legislation to target in-kind export subsidies at the EC did not
prevail when first seriously considered in 1983. The principal reason given by opponents was
the WOITY that such legislation would trigger a trade war in which the EC would increase their
subsidies and perhaps withdraw previously negotiated concessions such as their duty-free binding
on U.S. oilseed products and feed grain substitutes. In addition, the Secretary of Agriculture
already possessed sufficient authorities forflexportsubsidies as needed for surplus
management or strategic purposes.
Two years later, as the 1985 farm bill deliberations began, the situation was different in
two respects: farm groups had refined their general support for export promotion to more
concrete proposals; and U.S. wheat exports had declined still further while the EC's grew. In this
situation the Administration's desire to continue ad hoc subsidization without binding legislation
was no longer politically tenable.
Congressional debate. A detailed investigation of the political positions and arguments
concerning the EEP is helped greatly by the focus of all parties on the 1985 farm bill as the
venue for debate. Existing legislation, governing target prices and acreage reduction programs,
in the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, expired with the 1985 crops. Because of economic
20problems of the farm sector and disatisfaction with existing programs, many sought substantial
changes in the existing legislation.
Both the HOUSe and Senate Agriculture Committees conducted extensive hearings in
preparation for the 9.5 farm bill. The Senate committee, controlled by Republicans and chaired
by Jesse Helms of North Carolina, appeared particularly interested in a fundamental review of
agricultural policy (although tobecco policy was excluded). In 1983 Chairman Helms wrote to
some 300 industry and academic people, asking for comments and suggestions for the 1985
legislation. A selection of the responses was published by the committee (U.S. Senate, 1984).
In late 1984 and early 1985 both the House and Senate committees held hearings at various
locations in the country and in Washington, D.C. at which academic experts as well as interested
parties responded to requests for suggestions to revamp the commodity programs (U.S. Senate,
1985).
TWO issues of program structure emerged for the grain programs (beyond the overriding
general issue of the budget for these programs). The first was whether to support farmers' returns
by means of further acreage controls coupled with increased market price support via CCC loan
rates, or to let support levels follow market prices and support farm income through deficiency
payments. The second was what steps to take to promote increased exports of U.S. commodities.
Producer groups were divided on the first issue, with the National Farm Organization, the
National Farmers Union, and the National Grange arguing for high loan rates and stringent
production controls, and the (much larger) American Farm Bureau Federation arguing for less
controls and market-oriented loan levels. The National Association of Wheat Growers (NAWG)
took a middle position of marginal changes in the existing wheat program.
21The Reagan Administration, in its proposed Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1985, took
the Farm Bureau position on phasing out acreage controls, but went significantly further in the
market-oriented direction by calling for much lower target prices than any of the farm groups
wanted. The Administration's wheat provisions were outlined on March 7, 1985, as:
Loan rates are based on 75 percent of national average prices
received by farmers in the immediately preceding three years.
Target prices are based in 1986 on 100 percent of national average
prices received by producers during the immediately preceding
three years; this percentage would drop 5 percent each year until
it reaches 75 percent for the 1991 and succeeding crops.
An acreage reduction will be required of program participants at
the following levels: 15 percent —1986crop year; 10 percent —
1987;5 percent —1988crop year; 1989 and thereafter, the
authority for acreage reduction would be eliminated (U.S. Senate,
Reauthorization, Part 1, p. 403).
The Administration largely prevailed on loan rates (where they took essentially the Farm
Bureau position), but lost on target prices and on phasing out acreage controls. The implied
target price cuts led members of the Congressional committees to label the Administration's bill
"dead on arrival."
With respect to export promotion, the Administration wanted to maintain discretionary
authority to negotiate with trading partners to remove barriers to U.S. exports, and to continue
export credit programs and food aid programs. But there were no explicit export subsidies
22proposed. In Congress and among agricultural interest groups, however, sentiments were quite
different. The successful use of CCC stocks to pay farmers for idling additional land in the
1983 Payment in Kind (P1K) program prompted several commodity groups to adopt the label for
an "export P1K" program in which CCC stocks would be used to subsidize exports. The
domestic P1K resulted in additional wheat on the market in the United States, partly offsetting
the price-increasing effect of acreage idling. An export P1K, it was argued, would remove
commodities that were overhanging the U.S. market and hence drive up U.S.prices,in February
1983, the National Association of Wheat Growers (NAWO) and the Nebraska Wheat Strike Force
had testified before the Senate Agriculture Committee in favor of this general approach. Unlike
the case of acreage controls the American Farm Bureau also supported the Export P1K idea,
providing a united front among farm groups.4
In 1985, the wheat growers, principally through NAWG and U.S. Wheat Associates, the
growers' market development arm, had been arriving at their position through many months of
meetings. The wheat growers' focus on international marketing traditionally had to deal with a
"prairie populist" isolationist impulse that emphasized supply management and higher prices in
the domestic market. These sentiments had been fatally discredited for a majority of wheat
growers by the prosperity brought by the export boom and sales to the Soviets in the I 970s. The
populist impulse for an anti-government position was satisfied by the wheat growers' vociferous
objection to controls on export sales to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1974-76 and
1980.
4Statements of Ron Delano, President, American Farm Bureau, Don Leslie, President,
National Association of Wheat Growers, and Frank Johannsen, Nebraska Wheat Strike Force
(U.S. Senate, 1983, pp. 28, 40-44).
23As the 1985 farm bill debate began, NAWG backed a "marketing loan"approach,under
which producers could repay their CCC loans at the local market price of wheat and reclaim the
wheat for sale. This essentially would establish a general (domestic and export) subsidy.
However, the wheat growers also supported the EEP in written testimony for the Senate
Agriculture Committee in 1984 (Schwensen 1984). The EEP approach was ea.sy to assimilate
to export promotion proposals NAWG already had made.5
On the agribusiness side, the grain exporting companies of course supported export
subsidies, with caveats about maintaining the companies autonomy in negotiating sales. Even
bakers and grain millers, who might have opposed the subsidized export of their raw material,
did not object. The American Bakers Association's President did not take a position on the
subject, and the Millers National Association testified in favor.6 One reason is that the first major
shot fired in the export subsidy dispute with the EC had been an arrangement negotiated under
existing authorities of the Secretary of Agriculture in which 30 million bushels of CCC wheat
was given free of charge to flour mills who then sold 1 million tons of flour (requiring about 50
million bushels of wheat) to Egypt, at a price low enough to capture that market from the EC.
This "largest flour sale in history" won the hearts of the millers. A second reason is that
5Among many interestin$ arguments of the wheat growers, one was that the Reagan
Administration "has a double standard bordering on hypocrisy. They advocate but close off
export markets by placing protectionist measures against steel, textiles, and other products need
to send to us to gain foreign exchange." U.S. Senate, Examining, 1985, p. 42). This is one of
the very few instances in the thousands of pages of testimony on the 1985 farm bill in which
farmers rehearsed elements of their traditional free-trade line. Nonetheless, the wheat growers
practical thrust was for export (and domestic) subsidies.
6Statement of Roy M. Henwood, President, Millers National Association, U.S. Senate, 1983,
pp. 257-59; Statement of Robert Wager, President, American Bakers Association, U.S. House,
"General Farm Bill," Part 5, pp. 82-84.
24subsidies paid in kind out of existing stocks would place additional wheat on the market and
would not raise the domesticprice ofwheat as a cash export subsidy would.
Executive Branch Action. Senator Dole took the lead in organing a series of meetings
in spring, 1985, to get the Reagan Administration to establish a targeted export subsidyprogram
focused on grains, especially wheat. Representatives of NAWG as well as other farmgroups
attended these meetings, in Dole's office. In May 1985, the Administration (represented by
0MB, and USDA) and the Senate leadership (principally Dole and Senator Zorinsky) agreed to
implement under existing authorities7 an Export Enhancement Program.
In particular, the Export Enhancement Program was given the breath of life by the
conjunction of interests represented by three individuals: Senator Zorinsky's strong desire, as the
ranking Democrat on the Agriculture committee and representative of Nebraska, for a substantial
export subsidy program; David Stockman's need for Democratic votes on key economic
legislation; and Senator Doles brokering savvy, with interests in supporting both the
Administration (as Majority leader) and Kansas wheat growers.Stockman agreed the
Administration would implement an export subsidy program, in exchange for Zorinsky's vote on
the budget resolution containing the Reagan Administration's fiscal proposals, with the subsidies
to take the form of unwanted CCC surplus commodities with a zero budget score.
The agreed-upon program committed $2 billion worth of CCC-owned commodities to be
made available as a bonus to U.S. exporters to expand sales of U.S. agricultural commodities in
7Authorities of the Secretary of Agriculture as Chief Executive Officer of the Commodity
Credit Corporation under the CCC Charter Act of 1936.
25targeted markets. The objectives stated were to increase U.S. farm exports and to encourage
trading partners to begin serious negotiations on agricultural trade problems.*
Guidelines fortheEEP, established by the Economic Policy Council of the White House,
were that each subsidized sale should meet the following criteria: (1) additionality, i.e., net
increase in export sales caused by the subsidized sale; (2) targeting to displace competing
exporters who are subsidizing their sales; (3) a net gain to the U.S. economy; and (4) budget
neutrality.Each proposed EEP initiative was to be tested against thesecriteriaby an
interdepartmental committee chaired by the U.S. Trade Representative and USDA, but also
having representatives of 0MB, CEA, Treasury, State,Labor,Commerce, and NSC. It was never
publicly stated how the "net gain to the U.S. economy" and "budget neutrality" criteria were to
be defined and measured. Participants in the process indicated that criterion (3) was not a factor
in interagency debate, although (1), (2) and (4) were.9
Despite the creation of the EEP through Executive Branch action, farm and commodity
groups were so strongly in favor of an export subsidy program that Congress wished to exercise
authority and claim authorship of the Export Enhancement Program by establishing it in the l95
farm legislation. The key general issu&°was whether to target export subsidies to counter
competitors' subsidies or to subsidize exports more broadly. The House Agriculture Committee
Reca11 that the EEP was announced in the months leading up to the Ponte del Este meeting
which launched the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
91n November, 1989, USDA published revised guidelines in the Federal Register which
emphasized the trade policy objectives of challenging competitors who subsidize exports and
encouraging negotiations in the Uruguay Round. See Ackerman and Smith, 1990, pp. 6-7.
°"General" meaning basic principles of design. Committee deliberations devoted more time
to specific issues of interest to members (e.g., how much white wheat from Washington in the
program) than to any general issue.
26took the broadview thatsubsidies in kind would boost exports by "countering the effects of
foreign subsidies in international markets; compensating for the high value of the dollar;
alleviating the cost of transportation" of U.S. agricultural goods "(U.S. House of Representatives.
Report, 1985, p. 71). This led the House to support a broad, untargeted export subsidyprogram
called BICEP —BonusIncentive Commodity Export Program —apparentlyto highlight the
application of governmental muscle to agricultural exports.
Legislative Action. The Food Security Act (FSA) as finally enacted in December 1985
reflected the Senates closer ties to the Administration by codifying the EEP essentiallyas the
Administration had established it six months earlier. The main issues, as often in enabling
legislation, were what the Executive Branch "shall" (be required to) do and "may" (has
discretionary authority to) do. The 1985 Act required the Secretary of Agriculture to provide
CCC commodities at no cost to "United States exporters, users, andprocessors and foreign
purchasers, and required that a total of $2 billion in CCC commodities be used for this purpose
during the three fiscal years ending September 30, 1988. The purposes which the subsidized
exports were (0 serve are even more broadly stated than in the House bill: in addition to
combating other countries subsidies and the high value of the dollar, export subsidies may be
used to offset "the adverse effects of U.S. agricultural price support levels that are temporarily
above the export prices offered by overseas competitors in export markets" (U.S. Code 99 STAT
1483).
"Transportation costs are a quantitatively small but highly politically charged issue in U.S.
export promotion programs. "Cargo preference," a requirement that food aid be shipped on U.S.
vessels, has been an issue in EEP, export credit, and sales to the Soviets. Cargo preference has
not been required for EEP shipments.
27In addition, the Act authorized the unlimited use of cross-subsidization, i.e., the use of one
CCC commoditytosubsidize the export of another. This was politically important because many
commodityinterests,including processed products and products which did not have price support
programs, prevailed upontheAgricultureCommitteesfor support. Egg producers and pork
producers, for example, testified that they needed assistance in competing with EC export
subsidies. But no CCC stocks of these commodities existed. The legislation shared EEP benefits
across commodities by permitting CCC wheat stocks to be used to subsidize egg or pork EEP
exports, for example.'2
The I 9I5 Act thus established the authority for either narrowly targeted or broad-based
export subsidies, and mandated $2 billion in spending on the program over three years.'3 The
EEP was not subject to discipline in the annual appropriations process, because the
Appropriations Committees provide generally open-ended funding for the Commodity Credit
Corporation to achieve its price support mandates. The Committees do not control how the CCC
uses its acquired commodity stocks. Congress could have brought budgetary disciplines to bear
The EEP is not as barter-based as this discussion might suggest. Exporters never received
actual tons of CCC grain as a subsidy, but rather certificates entitling them to grain at any time
up to an expiration (late six months from the date of issue. A market quickly emerged in which
these certificates could be sold at only a small discount from the market value of the grain.
Since exporters could take their transactions costs into account in their bids, the subsidy in kind
is very close to the equivalent of a cash subsidy. And when available CCC stocks ran out in
1991, the program was smoothly converted to one where certificates are redeemable for cash.
'31n the context of budgetary pressures, authorized spending for this period (FY 1985-88) was
amended to a reduced minimum of $1 billion and a maximum of $1.5 billion in 1986. However,
the actual value of bonuses for this 3-year period turned out to be $2.2 billion. After the $1.5
billion ceiling was reached, in mid 1987, USDA announced that EEP bonuses would continue
under the CCC Charter Act under which the EEP was originally established (see Ackerman and
Smith, p. 5, for more detail on authorization and spending under EEP).
28by scoringEEPcosts in Budget Committeeproceedings. However, the Congress agreedwith
0MB on zero scoring for EEP. The principalargument wasthat CCC commodities cost so much
to store that it was worth about as much to give them away as to keep them. Inaddition, to the
extentthat increased exports increased the U.S. market price, deficiencypayments for wheat and
other target-price commodities would be reduced.
The EEP in a Broader PoliticalContext. TheExport Enhancement Programcaine into
beingwith very little opposition between February and December 1985. Why was the way so
clear? The natural opponents of an export subsidy are U.S. domestic wheatbuyers and foreign
wheat producers.In the case of EEP U.S. millers were diverted by their participation in
subsidized flour exports and by the release of CCC stocks topay the subsidies, as discussed
earlier. The bakers and broader consumer groups were relatively weak participants, and their
participationin the1985farmbill debate was focused on opposition to acreage controls and on
limitingbudgetaryoutlays. The latter point was the dominant item of contention throughout
1985.
Thel95farmbill was debated in the culminating period of the "farm crisis" and at the
same time the bill known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings14was being developed. Just before the
Congressional farm bill debate began, in February 1985, President Reagan vetoed a farm bailout
bill that would have forgiven billons of dollars of farm debt and made new subsidized and
guaranteed loans to farmers in trouble. The Administration's proposal, in its Agricultural
Adjustment Act of l9l5, to go still further and cut benefits that farmers were already receiving
14Enacted as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, to become
effective in early 1986.
29caused this aspect of the bill to be labelled, correctly, as "dead on arrival" by Congressional
Democrats.
While the testimony on export promotion was proceeding as described earlier, much more
contentious and widely reported hearings were being held on the broad problems of agriculture.
Newsweek had a 5-page story featuring an Iowa State agricultural economist's estimate that 12
percent of U.S. farmers would go out of business in 1985, and 30 percent were "sliding toward
insolvency" (Newsweek, Feb. IS, 1985, p. 52). At a special hearing staged by Congressional
Democrats (no Republicans attended) three famous actresses of the day (Jane Fonda, Jessica
Lange, Cissy Spacek) appeared, each of whom had starred in movies featuring heroic struggles
of farmers against economic adversity and insensitive bureaucrats. The actresses "decried the
farm policies of the Reagan Administration as uncaring and insensitive to rural America's
anguish" (Washington May7, l985).
In this context it was probably not reasonable to expect national consumer groups to adopt
positions in support of cuts in farm support, and none did.
The role of outside experts on the economics of agriculture is more difficult to explain.
Many such experts submitted testimony, on many aspects of farm programs. In 1984, twelve
economists made written contributions to the Senate Agriculture Committee's trade policy
compendium (U.S. Senate, 1984b). Of these, none proposed export subsidies, and the three that
'5This was the only 1985 agricultural hearing to run on all 3 prime time network newscasts.
The Equotedone actress as saying "the solid core of our agriculture is threatened," and further
quoted: "It is heartbreaking to witness their anguish as they watch their lives being stripped
away,' Lange said of farmers as she choked back tears." The Post played the story on page 1,
but it was page 1 of the "Style" section under the headline, "The Farm Act. This deflated the
impact somewhat.
30addressed the issue directly all raised objectionstothe idea ( D.G. Johnson, D.A. ORourke, and
J.A.Sharples).In the 1985 heariigs, also, rioeconomists supported the EEP. This maybein
partdue to a lack of opportunity, since the EEP was not spelled out in a form that testifying
economists could react to before it was introduced as a non-legislated filil accompli in May 1985.
But even if economists did not object formally to the EEP, it was clear from their general
comments on trade policy that they would have opposed it because of concern about igniting a
subsidy war and because of low expected benefits to farmers per dollar of cost to consumers and
taxpayers.
Another source of independent testimony was the statements of five former Secretaries
of Agriculture —OrvilleFreeman (Kennedy), Clifford Hardin (Nixon), Earl Butz (Nixon/Ford).
John Knebel (Ford), and Bob Bergland (Carter) —inU.S. Senate (l984b). Their comments
focused on trade issues, and supported various measures to stimulate exports.But none
advocated direct export subsidies.
During October-December, 1985 the farm bill assumed its final form. The House passed
its version on October 8, the Senate on November 22, and the Conference Committee reached
agreement on a bill which achieved final passage on December 18. This period was marked by
sharp debate. The anti-farm support side was almost entirely a matter of budgetary exposure, the
end-game issue turning on whether target prices should be frozen for 1 year (Administration) or
4 years (Congressional Democrats) before declining. The ultimate compromise was a two-year
freeze followed by modest cuts. The wheat target price $4.38 per bushel for 1985 crops, was
31kept at $4.38 in 1986 and 1987, thencutin steps to $4.00 by 1990.16 Because the debate focused
almost exclusively on budgetary issues, for wheat and other commodities (notably dairy), the EEP
received little legislative attention.
The overall compromise achieved was of the highly pragmatic type in which legislators
like Congressman Foley and Senator Dole worked from a middle ground outward to obtain a
majority. Both the most ardent pro-farmer voices and most ardent budget-cutters opposed the
bill. The vote for final passage was 325-96 in the House and 55-38 in the Senate. Both the
Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, Jesse Helms (N.C.) and the ranking Democrat,
EdZorinsky(Neb.) voted against the bill, for opposite reasons. President Reagan signed the bill
into lawonDec. 23,1985.
Insummary, the Export Enhancement Program was enacted in 1985 because wheat
growers and exporters asked for it, and no interest group opposed it, except economists in general
terms. Because the pressure to assist agriculture was strong, and was countered only by
budgetary pressures, the 0MB finding that the EEP would be budget neutral ensured its
supporters of an easy political victory.17
'6While there were no immediate budgetary savings through target price CUtS,itwas known
by the time of Conference Committee action that ORH provisions would require a reduction in
deficiency payments for FY 1986 (the 1st crop year of the new bill, for which winter wheat was
already planted). In the event farmers had their payments reduced by 4.3 percent in FY 1986.
The wheat target price remained at $4.00 through 1993, and is scheduled to continue at that level
through 1995.
'7Congress' own budget agency, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), has not accepted
the budget neutrality argument. Indeed CBO has in recent years called attention to the EEP as
a potential area for budgetary savings, estimating most recently a $4.2 billion saving in FY 1995-
99 if the baseline EEP spending of $5.0 billion over this period were eliminated (U.S. Congress,
1994, p. 218). Their clinching argument against the budget neutrality of EEP is the following:
Whatever price effects could be achieved by EEP could also be achieved at lower budget cost
32Related Export Assistance
In addition to the Export Enhancement Program, wheat exports continue to be promoted
by:
— foodassistance, through Public Law 480 and related programs, under which about 3
million tons of wheat are shipped each year under generous credit terms that amount on
average to a substantial subsidy on limited quantities in country-to-country agreements.
— exportcredit, with guaranteed repayment to lenders by the U.S. Treasury if the foreign
borrower defaults. The interest rate is a commercial rate negotiated by borrower and
tender, typically just above the LIBOR (London Interbank offer rate), a rate available only
because of the guarantee. The U.S. government has had to absorb substantial tosses from
loans to Iraq, and the possibility of big losses on credits to Russia.
— TheTargeted Export Assistance program, introduced in the 1985 Act, provides matching
funds for private-sector initiatives to promote agricultural exports. This program was
reformulated as the Market Promotion Program in the 1990 Farm Act, and its budget has
been reduced from over $300 million authorized in 1985 to about $100 million for FY
1994. About 10 percent ot the program's expenditures have been used to promote grains
and grain products with $50 million spent in 1986-89 (Ackerman and Smith, p. 39).
Farm and agribusiness groups have consistently supported these programs. Groups
interested in international development —mainlynonprofit foundations, and charitable
organizations —havequestioned the negative impact of food aid on food production in the
using acreage reductions (ARPS). With both EEP and ARPs the subject of annual policy
determination, one should not hold the ARP constant when evaluating the EEP.
33recipient countries. But these groups have also supported food aid in times of famine or
emergency. Other international interests have promoted food assistance for geopolitical reasons,
notably to Russia, Egypt, and Pakistan. There has been no sustained political opposition to these
programs, except as part of generic budget cutting.
An illustration of how these programs work in tandem is afforded by recent wheat sales
to the former Soviet Union. In FY 1992, roughly coinciding with President Yeltsen's first year
as leader of Russia, the United States exported 8.7 million metric tons of wheat to the former
Soviet Union. Market receipts for the wheat were $ 1.022 billion, or $117 per ton. Russia and
the other former republics could not afford to pay hard currency for this wheat. The wheat was
sold through a combination of government-guaranteed commercial credit, EEP subsidies, and food
aid programs. $S10 million in credit was allocated to the FSU for wheat and wheat product
purchases in late 1991. $350 million in EEP bonuses were paid on 8.4 million tons of wheat in
FY1992 ($41.50 per ton on average). The credit program, called GSM-102, involves short-term
credit, up to three years, with a repayment schedule beginning in the first year. By November
1992 Russia's repayments were sufficiently in arrears to trigger their suspension from the
program. However, in FY 1993 a more liberal credit program for Russia was established under
"Food for Progress" authorities of USDA. This credit is financed directly from the U.S.
government rather than through commercial banks, and has a longer repayment period and lower
than commercial interest rates. Credit is even granted, using CCC funds, for freight and handling
costs. In addition, 700,000 tons of feed wheat have been donated to the FSU. (For further
details, see USDA, 1993, pp. 39-45). Overall, while the EEP subsidy on U.S. wheat exports to
34the FSU amounts to about30percent of the U.S. Gulf price, the package altogether amounts to
a much larger export subsidy.
The main political pressures in these subsidies have come from Representatives and
Senators whose wheat growers have been concerned that credit has not been allocated quickly
enough to keep wheat moving. Fiscal cautions have also been raised, and have probably
restrained FY 1993 and 1994 wheat sales to the FSU somewhat.
Consequences and Evaluation of the Program
Questions were being raised about the effectiveness of Export Enhancement Program even
before its legislative enactment. The Administration announced its first EEP initiatives in May,
1985, By October only two sales had been made, 500,000 tons of wheat and 175,000 tons of
wheat flour to Egypt. The administration in May had appointed an Advisory Committee on the
Export Enhancement Program, consisting primarily of commodity group and agribusiness
representatives. In August, the Committee's representatives from the National Corn Growers and
U.S. Wheat Associates, joined by four other committee members, issued a press release saying
they were "disappointed and frustrated over the lack of any concrete results from the EEP
(National Corn Growers, 1985). b Octobçr and November the House Committee on Agriculture's
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture held hearings to
review complaints about EEP administration.
The substance of the commodity group complaints was that the EEP was being carried
out in too restrictive a manner. In particular, the groups argued that wheat sales to the Soviets
fell under the EEP criteria listed earlier. The EC had since 1980expandedits subsidized wheat
35exports to theSovietUnion substantially, yet USDA had not approved an EEP initiative for U.S.
wheat sales to the Soviet Union. The Soviets were switching wheat purchases from the United
States to the EC, even though that meant not honoring their purchase agreements with the U.S.
under a previously negotiated long-term grain sales agreement. The Hearings made clear,
however, that even if USDA were willing to accede to the Sovie& ploy to acquire previously
agreed upon shipments at a lower price, potential exporters of non-agricultural products to the
USSR would not accept subsiding wheat sales to the USSR while other holds on US/Soviet
economic arrangements were in place as part of the political struggle for freer emigration from
the USSR (U.S. House, 1986). It was not clear, however, which particular export industries
Congress was hearing from on this point.
Apart from being subject to such political constraints, the procedures for implementing
EEP were far from clear. There were (and are) two main steps: Administration approval of an
EEP initiative, and USDA's acceptance of exporters bids for bonuses under the initiative.
Approval of an initiative is done by the EEP interagency committee described earlier, after a
proposal by USDA, based on the criteria of additionality, targeting, cost effectiveness, and budget
neutrality.' For example, one of tie first initiatives approved was for the sale of 1 million tons
of wheat to Algeria. With the initiative in place, a U.S. exporting firm can attempt to arrange
a sale with an importing fmn (or government agency) in Algeria. If the exporting firm cannot
meet the price offered by competing exporters, in this case the EC, it will apply to USDA for a
"bonus", of commodity certificates equal in value to the amount needed to make up the difference
The outside EEP Advisory Committee understood there to be two additional criteria:
coincidence with overall U.S. trade policy, and approval by the interagency committee (U.S.
House, Review, 1985, p. 88).
36between the cost of U.S. wheat delivered to Algeria and the price negotiated to make the sale.
USDA assesses U.S., EC, and Algerian market conditions and either approves or disapproves the
deal. If the transaction is approved, the firm receives the certificate requested and ships the
wheat.
This mechanism is quite different from the approaih used for wheat export subsidies by
the EC, or by the United States in its pre-1972 program, of periodically announcing a dollar value
of the subsidy,say$35 per ton, and then letting any firms who export U.S. wheat collect that
amount on the exportedquantities.The approach raises questions of how USDA can determine,
foreachproposed sale,whatthe competitors' price is. Wouldn't the competitors' price itself be
affected by EEP?And, is there sufficientincentive for U.S. commercial exporters to obtain the
highest possible marketprice?
USDA Undersecretary Amstutz testified on the newEEP mechanismas follows:
Programimplementation,in terms of mechanics such as tendering and
contractual arrangements, has remained flexible. Procedures have varied from
country to country to accommodate the individual buying systems of the importing
nations involved in the program.
The bonus is to be sufficient to allow our commodities to be competitive,
but it is not intended to undercut the world market price. In other words, the
program is designed to er.sure that sales made under it are a' commercial, not
concessional, prices.
To ensure that we are meeting these competitive and commercial
objectives, a price review process has been developed. The process calls for a
review of the level of both the bonus and the sale price. This is to assure not only
that the bonus paid to exporters is not too high, but also that the sale price,
relative to subsidized foreign competition, is not too low.
In the price review we determine the cost of delivering the U.S. commodity
to the foreign buyer and the price at which the same commodity can be delivered
to the same destination by subsidized foreign competitors.
37The difference between the two —theamount by which the competition
can under-price us —isused in determining the acceptable bonus.
Currently,an exporter isrequired to post a performance security with CCC
before CCC will consider the exporter's offer. Onceanoffer is accepted, the
exporter reserves bonus commodities from CCC inventories. After shipment, the
exporter must furnish proof of export to request delivery of the bonus commodity.
After the exported goods arrive in the destination country, USDA releases the
performance security posted by the exporters. (Amstutz, p. 142).
Neither this nor other statements of USDA have answered questions about U.S. exporters'
incentives and pricing behavior under the EEP. But these were not issues of concern to Congress
in 1985 (or later). The main objection of House Agriculture committee members to the EEP was
their desire for a program that would subsidize most or all wheat exports, not just a subset of
targeted markets. Two main concerns were raised about the operation of the EEP: first, it would
antagonize uaclitional buyers of U.S. commodities who did not receive the subsidized price, hence
possibly driving them to other suppliers; and second, it would drive down the prices received by
nonsubsidizing competitors like Argentina and Australia. At the House hearings, several
commodity groups raised the first concern, and the General Accounting Office the second.
Economic Analysis of EEP
While economists' analyses did not play a role in the 1985 legislative process, analytical
work was available which did not make the EEP attractive. The standard argument (e.g., in Dixit
and Norman) that for purposes of domestic income redistribution a domestic distortion is always
preferable to a border distortion, should apply to agricultural export subsidies undertaken for the
purpose of farm income support. The question addressed in agricultural economists' analyses is
whether there are second-best or other special characteristics of the world wheat situation that
make targeted, in-kind export subsidies more attractive.
38General (Untargeted) Export Subsidy. Considertheeffect of a subsidy in the 1985 U.S.
wheat market. Using the elasticities of Paarlberg (1984) of -1.5 for the short-run demand for U.S.
wheat exports and -0.2 for U.S. domestic demand, the 1985-crop situation is shown in figure 7.
Of the 2,400 million bushels produced, 900 million bushels were exported and 1,050 were
consumed domestically, leaving 450 million bushels added to CCC stocks at the farm-level
supported price of $3. 10.19 Despite the inelastic demand for domestic use, CCC activity creates
perfectly elastic demand at the market support price (not the target price).
Suppose we introduce an export subsidy, s, of $.40 per bushel ($15 per ton). This drives
down the world price of wheat by $15 per ton and increases the demand for U.S. wheat by about
300 million bushels. The U.S. domestic price remains unchanged, because of the CCC loan
program. If the price were to rise above the supported level, wheat would not go into the CCC
program; but there is too much wheat to clear the market at any price above the support level.
CCC loan availability creates a perfectly elastic demand at the support price level, so the total
demand for wheat, in the absence of the export subsidy, is D.r. Introducing the export subsidy
shifts total demand to D..'. Wheat is exported rather than going into stocks.
The gains and losses to the United States are as follows. Domestic consumers and
producers are unaffected, since the U.S. price remains the same. Budgetary outlays are s times
the quantity exported, here $.40 x 1.2 billion bushel =$480million annually. But there is a
tIThe legislated support price was $3.30, but this translated to an average farm-level price
of $3.10 in the 1985/1986 marketing year.










0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3budgetary saving from not havingtopayCCCloans of $3.10 x 300 million bushels, or $930
million. This implies a net budgetary saving of $450 million in the current fiscal year. However,
current-year flow accounting (although it is what drives budget scoring) does not take into
account the value of the wheat the government owns. There is no agreed-upon valuation of CCC
stocks, or even an agreed-upon method for determining their value. The principal necessary
calculations are (discounted) expected storage costs over the period the grain will be held, and
the expected value of the grain when sold. Assuming 3 years of storage costs and eventual sale
at roughly the loan rate (acquisition price), the present value of $930 million spent on CCC wheat
is about half its cost, or $465 million. So the net government savings are (480-465 =)$15
million.
According to the analysis so far, farmers do not gain from the export subsidy. However,
this also occurs only because the diagram shows only the current year, in which wheat acreage
and input decisions are fixed by wheat program provisions. Under the wheat program the supply
function is changed in more complicated ways than is the demand side of the market. Producers
receive a deficiency payment that they know will make up the difference between the target price
($4.38 in 1985) and the U.S. average price in the 5-month peak marketing season (June-October).
So they should make planting decisions, in the preceding autumn for winter wheat and spring for
spring wheat, based on the target price, not the expected market price. However, in order to
qualify for deficiency payments farmers had to stay within their acreage base, and hold idle 20
percent of base acreage. Therefore, the incentive price for growing wheat is considerably less
than the target price. For 1985 1 have estimated the average producer's incentive price was about
$3.75 per bushel as compared to the $4.38 target price (Gardner 1991). Moreover, producers are
41limited in their ability to respond to the incentive price. They cannot expand acreage as already
mentioned. They can expand output by using more fertilizer or other inputs, but deficiency payments
provide no incentive for this because payments arc made on a fixed (since 1981) yield base which is
assigned to each producer. A final complication is that, principally because of land idling
requirements, some farmers choose not to participate. For them the incentive price is the market
price.
In calculating farmers gains from an export subsidy, these considerations come into play
through the annual determination of the acreage reduction percentage (ARP). The reason the ARP
was as high as 20 percent in 1985 (and 27.5 percent in 1986 and 1987) is the large prior CCC stock
accumulation. The 450 million bushels added to stocks from the 1985 crop was piled on top of the
1.4 billion already accumulated. If 300 million bushels could have been exported instead of being
added to stocks, the ARP could have been reduced accordingly. At the U.S. average yield of about
35 bushels per acre, 8 1/2 million acres could have been planted that had been held idle. At a net
rental value of wheat land of $40 per acre, the gain to wheat producers would be $340 million.
The results of the two ways of accommodating a general wheat export subsidy under 1985
conditions are summarized in Table 4.
Given the existence of excessive CCC wheat stocks or ARPs, an export subsidy program has
quite small costs. However, an option with smaller costs would result from a domestic consump- tion
subsidy. In figure 7, ifs were paid on all consumption the budget cost of the subsidy would


















welfare gain 15 -140
43
-465 0
overall budget -15 -480
effect
farm income 0 + 340
effectbe offset, except for a small triangle, by gains to U.S. consumers. An alternate policy would be
to pay a larger subsidy on domestic consumption than on exports (or even taxing exports). This
avoids using U.S. Treasury funds to provide lower-cost consumption abroad.
Special Features of EEP. The Export Enhancement Program differs from a general export
subsidy in three key respects: targeting of particular importing countries to receive subsidies:
limiting the quantity of wheat eligible to each targeted country, and payment in kind of the subsidy
in the form of CCC stocks.
Targeting and quantity limitation are attractive because they reduce budgetary outlays for
subsidies and because they do not undercut the prices of our non-subsidizing competitors, notably
Argentina and Australia. At least that is the thought. We pay the subsidy of s to reduce the price
of, say, one-third of U.S. wheat exports while continuing to sell the rest at unsubsidized world
price.
The question with respect to country targeting is whether the policy is capable of creating
the price wedge s between the targeted and non-targeted wheat importing countries.
Transportation and other transactions costs between these countries suggests there would not be
fully price-equalizing arbitrage. But there is also the problem of redirection of the competitors'
wheat exports. If the United States sends wheat to Algeria, replacing EC wheat, then the EC
One might consider pushing this policy further by letting the support price fall to a level
that permits the entire 2.4 billion bushels produced be consumed. In figure 7, this is achieved at a
price of $2.00 per bushel. As compared to the $3.10 price, this policy would add $1.10 x 2.4
billion =$2.64billion of budget outlays, partly offset by consumer gains of roughly $430 million
and net CCC stock savings of $700 million (assuming CCC stocks valued at half the support
price) QL$510million in producer gains if ARPs are reduced and stock buildup maintained. In
either case the net cost of the policy is over $1.5 billion (mainly because of the bonanza given to
foreign consumers). In fact, the 1985 "marketing loan' proposal of the wheat growers would
have generated this kind of result. Because of its potential budget costs (which depend crucially
on the elasticity of total demand for wheat) this proposal was a non-starter in the 1985
Congressional debate.
44sends the wheat that otherwise would have gone to Algeria tohan,say. But despite the
multichannel natureof worldwheat trade there arepossibilitiesof U.S. export subsidies chatiging
the spatialpricepattern, and some economists have developed arguments on how the United
States could exploit differing elasticities of demand for U.S. wheat to profit from targeted
subsidies as a form ofpricediscrimination (Dutton 1992). However, the knowledge base on
these elasticities and arbitragepossibilitiesis essentially nil, and thesestudieshave no detectable
connection with the actual administration of the EEP, or with what the wheat producers had in
mind.
The quantity limitation raisesotherproblems. As the wheat growers noted in their
criticism of the first EEPsalesto Egypt, once thesaleswerecomplete the EC reentered the
market and sold at the pre-EEPprices. It appears that the price at the margin is the non-
subsidizedprice, so there is no reason for the EEP recipients to consume more wheat with the
EEP in place than without it. But if no country consumes more wheat because of the EEP, the
market-clearing price will remain unchanged, as will U.S. and other countries' exports. EC
exports and prices remain unchanged, and the United States will have done nothing to force the
EC to increase their export subsidies, hence driving them to the GATTbargainingtable. We
have simply transferred funds from U.S. taxpayers to Egyptian buyers (probably the government)
on an intramarginal quantity of wheat imports. However, there are complications.
First,itis not clear that the U.S. EEP quantities are so limited as make sales intramarginal
in the targeted countries. Second, payment in kind makes a real difference, even though subsidies
are given to wheat exporters in the form of generic certificates that are transferable and can be
used against any CCC-owned commodity. Even if exporters cash out their certificates, the buyer
45of them must redeem them for CCC commodities before their expiration date, so that wheat will
inevitably be redeemed.2' This was important in 1985 because the CCC by law could not dispose
of its stocks until market prices rose well above their current or likely attainable levels.
Therefore, the EEP provided a way to place on the market commodities that otherwise would
have been sequestered. In this way the EEP tended to place general downwardpressure onworld
wheat prices, by increasing marketed supplies. Chambers and Paarlberg (1991) argue that this
effect could have caused the EEP to generate a net loss to the United States. However, if CCC-
stock reductions trade off with equivalent ARP changes, the supply-increasing feature of the EEP
subsidy can always be neutralized.
Assessment of EEP Orations.
It seems impossible to predict much about the consequences of EEP on the basis of a
general economic analysis of it. How then are the criteria to be met for EEP sales —
additionality,net economic gain, and budget neutrality —tobe assessed against the program's
operations? Turning first to the data for 1985-1992, statistics of EEP shipments are shown in
Table 5. After a slow start, EEP exports reached 26.6 million metric tons in Fiscal 1988, about
half of all U.S. wheat exports.23 The average subsidy reached $38 per ton in 1987. A price
21lndeed, by the end of 1991 all available CCC commodities had been distributed to holders
of certificates or otherwise sold.
22The 1985 and 1990 Farm Acts made it easiertodispose of these stocks after 1985.
23Reporting of Fiscal Year EEP data and crop year total export datacreatespossible
confusion. Fiscal years are October-to-September and wheat crop years are June-to-May. Fiscal
years are referred to by the calendar year in which they end, and crop years by the calendar year
in which they begin.
46Table 5.ExportEnhancement Program (EEP) wheat sales and bonuses
Fiscal EEP Total EEP Average Total U.S. EEP
Year Sales bonus EEPbonus Expor& Share2
metric tons dollars S/mt metric tons (%)
(millions) (millions) (millions)
1985 .5 11 21.84 28.0 2
1986 4.8 126 26.20 20.7 23
1987 14.1 541 3833 28.1 50
1988 26.6 819 30.83 40.6 66
1989 16.0 288 18.05 37.6 43
1990 14.3 241 16.84 33.2 43
1991 17.7 767 43.18 26.7 67
1992 19.7 813 41.14 34.3 58
1993 21.6 1281 33.82
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA
'Fiscal year exports, which differ from crop-year data used elsewhere in this paper. Constructed
from USDA monthly export statistics.
2 EEPtonnage as percentage of total export tonnage.
47wedge this large on substantial quantities would be expected to make a noticeable difference in
world trade flows and prices.
"Additionalitv". As an initial step in assessing the effectiveness of targeted export
subsidies under EEP. several economists have attempted estimates of additionality —thenet
increase in U.S. wheat exports caused by each ton of EEP-assisted shipments. If one simply
regresses wheat exports on EEP tonnage using the data of table S for 1986-92, the result is the
regression line shown in Figure 8a. This indicates that each ton of EEP sales generates 0.8 ton
of exports, which indicates only 20 percent of the EEP sale replaces commercial exports that
would have been made anyway, i.e., "additionality" is 80 percent. However, if we include the
3 years immediately preceding the EEP, thus incorporating a before-EEP and after-EEP contrast
in the data, the result is as shown in Figure 8b. This indicates additionality of zero. These
results indicate that a simple annual regression cannot provide a believable estimate of
additionality.
The approach taken in the literature is to build a supply-demand model of the world wheat
market, and simulate the effects of the EEP. To do this one has to model not only supply and
demand equations in the countries involved, both the targeted markets and non-targeted ones, but
also the trade linkages between them and the policy instruments that influence wheat trade.
Moreover, some policy instruments abroad should be treated as endogenous, since they may
respond to EEP. Brooks et al. (1990) argue that analyses that take policies other than the U.S.
EEP as given miss a key element, at least as far as Canada is concerned. Canada's wheat export
policy is not explicitly rule-driven; wheat is priced for export on an ad hoc basis by decisions
of the Canadian Wheat Board, which has a monopoly on exports. The Board has announced it




FIGURE 8b.EEP Sales and Wheat Exports
















25 30has a special program to counter U.S. EEP sales, but has not revealed details, nor the prices
received for Canadian wheat in the EEP-targeted markets. Australia has a similar wheat export
monopoly.
Given the difficulties of specifying a simulation model that one can have confidence in
for the purposes at hand, it is perhaps heartening that the range of additionality estimates is not
large. Brooks, et a] estimate that a ton of EEP exports added 8 to 13 percent of a ton to total
exports in 1986-88. Ackerman and Smith (p. 12) summarize five USDA-ERS studies whose
estimates of additionality range from 2 to 30 percent.
Additionality has become important in EEP policy because the budget neutrality of the
program depends on additionality. In the earlier calculations involving a general export subsidy
additionality depended only on the elasticity of foreign demand for U.S. wheat. Matters are more
complicated with the targeted EEP. Until the end of Fiscal 1991, subsidies in the form of CCC
stocks made budget neutrality easy to justify because of the high costs of carrying these stocks.24
Since November, 1991, when the CCC exhausted its available stocks and introduced cash
subsidies, the budget neutrality of EEP depends upon the programs ability to increase the U.S.
price of wheat and thus reduce deficiency payments.
The way EEP increases the U.S. price is by increasing the total demand for U.S. wheat.
USDAhas beenusing a wheat simulation model in which each million ton increase in wheat
exports generates an increase of 10 cents per bushel in the U.S. farm price of wheat. The
24CCC costs of holding grain are much higher than commercial storage rental rates plus the
opportunity cost of funds tied up, which sum to about $.40 per bushel annually. Stocks are
"rotated's (old wheat replaced with new) and relocated periodically. GAO estimates it costs the
CCC over $1.00 per bushel per year (25-30 percent of the price) to hold wheat.
50assumption that the CCC Supportlevelsets the market price is no longer appropriate since after
19S5thesupport levelhas been reduced and has alwaysbeensubstantiallybelow the market
price of wheat. Each 10 cent rise in the price of wheat reduces deficiency payments by $174
million. Empirical studies suggest additionality of 10 to 30 percent. Therefore an EEP of 20
million tons adds 2 to 6 million tons to U.S. export demand. With a $50/ton bonus level, the
budget outlays for the EEP are $Ibillion annually (recent levels). The 2 to 6 million ton
increase in exports causes the wheat price to rise 20 to 60 cents per bushel and hence budget
outlays to decline $350 to $1050 million annually. Thus, if the high end of additionality pertains,
which is what USDA assumes, the EEP is budget neutral.
Farm Income and Consumer Welfare Effects. The main losses from the Export
Enhancement Program accrue to domestic buyers of U.S. wheat. The exact incidence Ofl the
buyers' side —amongfarmers who feed wheat, millers, bakers, retailers, and final consumers —
hasnot been estimated. Because domestic final demand for foods containing wheat is quite
inelastic, domestic consumption of these products is unlikely to change appreciably because of
the EEP, and in fact domestic use has been quite stable over time despite large changes in wheat
prices. It is therefore unlikely that the EEP reduced the demand for, and thus the returns earned
by processors, distributors or other middlemen. Certainly the evidence in the political debate is
consistent with this conclusion. Millers and bakers who took public positions favored the Export
Enhancement Program (usually because they had export as well as domestic interests).
Farm use of wheat in feeding ranges from 5 to 20 percent of U.S. production. Wheat
feeding is highly concentrated in the late summer months after winter wheat is harvested but
51before the fall corn harvest, especially when year-end stocks of feed grains are low and old-crop
prices high. Generally, livestock producers who use this wheat have very good substitutes in
other feeds, so that feed use practically disappears in high-price years.
With an elasticity of demand for feed wheat of -4, the Export Enhancement Program
drives up the U.S. price of wheat 10 percent (35 cents per bushel), and if livestock prices do not
rise so that livestock producers absorb the feed cost increase, the expected cost of the EEP to the
livestock industry is about $100 million annually. To the extent meat prices rise, the cost is
shifted to consumers.
The remainder of the cost of higher wheat prices is absorbed by consumers of bread,
breakfast cereals, bakery products and other food items containing wheat.
USDA's economic analysis, which is the bas for OMB's budget work on EEP, uses a
model which provides estimates of farm income gains and consumer costs of EEP. The model
estimates that an increase of 10 cents per bushel in the price of wheat raises farm income by $60
million and reduces consumers' surplus by $120 million (Salathe, 1991). The consumer cost
estimate assumes farm price increases for all domestically used wheat are passed on to consumers
without any change in the farm-to-consumer markup or profits in the wheat processing industry.
The farm income increase is only about one-fourth of the rise in the market value of the wheat
crop because three-fourths of wheat production is protected by deficiency payments which decline
cent for cent as the market price rises.25
"This assumes the price rise occurs in the 5-month peak marketing season. In the 1990 Farm
Act, in any case, the calculation of deficiency payments was changed to a full-year basis after
1993. Since the full-year price averages 10 cents per bushel above the 5-month price, and the
payment will be determined by the maximum of the full-year price or the 5-month price pIus 10
cents, this change was scored as a budget saving (about $120 million a year) in the 1990 Budget
52The overall domestic welfare effect of the EEP can be estimated by summing the budget,
consumer and producer changes if we assume the farm income change is a changein economic
rents (i.e., farmland and farm operator labor as taken as fixed in supply). For the rangeof
additionality of .1 to .3, the EEP at its average recent size of about 20 million tons and costof
$1 billion annually, generates the results shown in table 6. While an optimistic assumption of
additionality permits EEP to achieve the objective of budget neutrality, no assumption permits
the program to achieve its cost-effectiveness objective of providing a benefit to the U.S.
economy. Indeed, the EEP is a particularly inefficient income transfer program by these
estimates, generating almost $1 in deadweight losses (from the U.S. viewpoint) for each $1 of
farm income gain even under optimistic additionality assumption.
International Effects. Political discussion of the Export Enhancement Program from its
inception emphasized the effects abroad as well as domestic effects in the United States.The
Bush Administration in 1989 and Congress in its reauthorization of EEP in 1990 focused even
more sharply on the foreign effects. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade (FACT)Act
of 1990, which authorizes the EEP at a level of not less than $500 million annually and explicitly
authorizes cash as well as in-kind subsidies, gives the only purpose of the EEP as being "to
Reconciliation Act negotiations.
261f such calculations are to be used in budget planning, one should also consider the ARP
as an alternative policy instrument. This is not a counterfactual exercise in the way invoking a
lump-sum transfer as an alternative policy would be. The ARP is in fact adjusted annually.The
Congressional Budget Office has argued that it would be preferable to reduce wheat acreage
rather than grow wheat and subsidize its export. Assuming .3 additionality, the same deficiency
payment farm income, and consumer costs as in the right hand column of table ..Gcouldbe
achieved with a paid land division program that would cost about $400 million (for 8 million
acres) instead of the $1 billion EEP subsidy cost.
53Table 6. Economic Gains from the EEP
Additionality .1 3
-- milliondollars annually--
Cost of EEP subsidies -1000 -1000
Deficiencypayment reduction 350 1050
[Subtotal: budgetary gain -650 50
Crop producers income gain120 300
Livestock feeders gain -40 -100
Consumers' gain 2QQ :QQ
TotalU.S. gain -770 -250
Source: Salathe (1991), and calculations described in text.
54discourage unfair trade practices" (U.S. House, 1990, p. 335). The contextfor this focus wasthe
continuedexpansion ofthe European Community's subsidized exports and the EC's intransigence
onagriculture in the Uruguay Round, then scheduled for completion inDecember1990. The
OmnibusBudget ReconciliationAct, enactedin October1990along withthe Farm (FACT)Act,
containeda "GAY!' trigger" which required spending $1 billion annually on EEPif no Uruguay
Roundagreement had been reached by June 30, 1992. Since no agreementhad been reached at
that time, EEP spending has proceeded at about the $1 billion rate.27
The international effects of the EEP are impossible to estimate with precision.
Uncertainties about effects on other countries' exports and on world prices are even greater than
in estimates of U.S. export additionality. The intention of targeted EEP subsidies is to displace
EC subsidized exports and increase the cost of EC export subsidies, yet not displace the exports
of non-subsidizing exporters. If perfectly realized, the result would be no change in worldwide
wheat imports, no change in (nonsubsidized) world wheat prices, but a rise in the U.S. wheat
price and wheat exports, and a fall EC wheat exports achieved byincreased stocks and reduced
acreage in the EC.
In fact, the EC would be expected to respond by reducing acreage, as they have done, but
also by countering EEP subsidies with increased subsidies of their own, thus retaining partof the
market. This competition would be likely to remove the intramarginal nature of thesubsidized
price in importing countries and reduce the price of all wheat in thesecontested markets.
27The wheat EEl' activity shown in table 2 accounts for most of U.S. agricultural export
subsidies, but EEl' bonuses have also been paid for exports of feedgrains, vegetable oil,rice,
eggs, frozen poultry, and dairy cattle. In FY 1992, totalEEP bonuses were $966 million, of
which $838 million were for wheat and wheat flour.
55Therefore, total wheat imports in these countries should increase. The best markets in which to
observe the consequences of the subsidy war are the North African wheat importers (Egypt,
Algeria, Morocco,Turiesia, andLibya), traditional buyers of French wheat and flour which were
the first and largest EEP targets (except Libya) and whose imports account for about 15 percent
of world wheat trade. Aggregate wheat imports in these countries have increased since 1985.
Indications are that North African buyers —principallygovernment-related enterprises with
substantial market power locally —havefilled their needs via tenders and bargaining which
results in all suppliers, the EC, U.S., Canada, Australia, and (in Libya) Argentina selling for
comparable prices (Ackerman, 1993; Parker, 1990). So the nonsubsidizing suppliers are being
harmed as well: the Canadian and Australian Wheat Boards have to subsidize their sales in these
markets also.
A question can also be raised about the capability of separating targeted and nontargeted
countries. Why would nontargeted countries keep buying at nonsubsidized prices? Even if re-
exports from, say, Morocco to Korea are ruled out by transportation costs, Australian exports
could easily be redirected from North Africa to Korea if the price were higher in Korea. So we
should expect to see wheat prices falling worldwide, except inside the U.S. and EC. Other
countries' wheat exports should be replaced by U.S. and EC wheat in importing countries where
the U.S. and EC compete, while competing exporters should increase their market share in
countries where the U.S. and EC do not offer subsidies. Such shifts have in fact occurred, but
nonetheless the United States ha retained the ability to export about half its wheat without EEl>
subsidies (although most of this has credit subsidies or is shipped in the P.L. 480 food assistance
56programs). Notably, Japan continues to buy about 3 to 5million metric tons of U.S.wheat
annually(10-15percent of U.S. exports) at non-subsidized prices.28
Dataon wheat border prices inseveralcountries areshownin Figure9. TheEEP,if
effective,should have increased theU.S. price, from whichthe subsidy is subtracted and
transportation addedtoobtainthe importingbuyer'sprice. And, ifthe EEP affectedother
countries' prices it should have reduced them. Comparing two U.S. prices (Kansas CityandU.S.
Gulf) with Canada, Australia, and Rotterdam price, no such pattern is apparent. Of course,the
levels ofpriceeverywhere are determined more by world crop conditions, U.S. ARPs, and
macroeconomic factors than by the EEP. But none of these factors would place a wedge between
U.S. and other exporters' wheat prices in the way the EEP might do. Yet, to take a long-term
comparison, the difference between the U.S. Kansas City priceand the Argentine, Canadian,
Rotterdam, and Australian prices are largely the same in 1984 with no EEP and in 1992,with
an average EEP bonus of $40 per ton. Indeed, if there is a difference it is thatthe U.S. prices
fJj relative to the foreign prices.
The data are more consistent with the hypothesis that the EEP drove down the price of
wheat in the targeted importing countries, with all the competing exporters who remained inthose
markets offering matching subsidies, while prices in the remaining markets were mutually
determined by spatial market forces which are basically the same as with no EEP. If this is true,
28Taking Japan as an importer with inelastic demand while other importers have relatively
elastic demand and exporters inelastic supply, we have an approximation (if other exporters
cooperate) of the situation shown by Dutton (1990) to create the possibilityof targeted export
subsidies being a second-best mechanism for exporters to exercise monopoly power. Thisresult
would show up empirically as an increase in the U.S. price of wheat for a given level of imports
(as U.S. wheat is reallocated from elastic-demand to inelastic-demand markets). Empirical
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54the economic effects of the Export Enhancement Program are at the low end of the ranges given
in Table 3, perhaps even lower.
The price relationship most crucial to the essentially null-effect interpretation of EEP
effects is that between the U.S. and Canada. If the EEP were to place a $30 to $50 wedge
between U.S. and Canadian prices for a period of 8 years there would be tremendous pressure
to export Canadian wheat to the United States. In fact, such pressure in the past has led to the
imposition of import quotas under the "section 22" authorities described earlier. But section 22
import quotas were removed by Executive Order in 1974 and have never been reinstated.
in 1992 and 1993 there has at last occurred a surge of wheat imports from Canada, about
2 million tons each year. This is a quadrupling of such imports compared to the 1980-1990
average. Yet as a percentage of either Canadian or U.S. wheat exports, the amounts are quite
small (refer back to figure 2). It is noteworthy also that much of these imports are of durum
wheat, a type used primarily in making pasta, and grown in the United States predominantly in
North Dakota and in Canada just across the border. The price of durum wheat moves rather
independently of other wheats.
The U.S. International Trade Commission investigated the Canadian exports of durum
wheat to the United States in response to Congressional requests. Their report (USITC, 1990)
attributes these exports in part to the Export Enhancement Program driving down the price of
durum wheat in the markets to which Canada has traditionally been exporting this product. Since
the ITC report, durum imports from Canada have increased substantially, from about 0.2 million
metric tons annually to 0.7 million tons in 1992/93. U.S. durum exports have continued at about
591.5 million tons annually during this period, with the majority receiving EEP subsidies in the
range of $25-$50 per ton. In 1992, U.S. durum exports under EEP were 0.9 million tons,with
an average bonusof$42.50 per ton (Alston and Carter, 1993). This would appear a clear case
of the EEP creating a wedge between U.S. and Canadian prices, so that durum wheat going out
through the front door (to North Africa and South America) comes back in through Canada. The
picture is complicated, however, by the facts that U.S. durum wheat in 1992 had declined in price
since 1989, sold at a lower price than average wheat in the U.S., and that U.S. durum wheat
acreage and production declined in 1992 by roughly the amount of the increased Canadian
shipments to the United States. The National Association of Wheat Growers has cited the data
of table 4 as showing a lack of correlation between U.S. durum exports under EEP and Canadian
wheat exports to the United States.
The economic analysis carries political freight because if the imports are attributable to
autonomous Canadian policies rather than being caused by the EEP, the case is better for
imposing section 22 import quotas. The case to be made is that Canadian exports interfere with
the operation of the U.S. wheat program. These imports can be argued to have increased the cost
of the program by driving up deficiency payments slightly, but whether this argument is legally
sufficient remains to be determined.Ln the course of the NAFTA debate, the Clinton
Adminstration promised an inquiry into the matter, which the ITC subsequently undertook but
as of March 1994 was incomplete. In addition to the general section 22 issue, there is a question
whether such quotas applied to Canada would violate the U.S/Canadian Free Trade Agreement.
Section 22 quotas are global quotas but exempting Canada would nullify their effectiveness.
60Table 4. Data on Wheat Trade Between Canada and the United States
U.S. EEP Sales Canadian Durum All Canadian
of DurumWheat Exports to the Wheat Exports
(Worldwide) United States to the U.S.
Crop Year
(July-June) 1000 metric tons
1985/86 50 0 220
1986/87 1122 59 417
l987/8 942 177 320
1988/89 187 191 285
1989/90 700 173 379
1990/91 990 330 547
1991/92 673 393 858
1992/93 895 420 1320
Source:National Association of Wheat Growers
61Political Response to the EEP
In 1990 the legislation authorizing the EEP (and other farm programs) expired and was
reconsidered in a comprehensive set of hearings (U.S. House, 1991; U.S. Senate, 1991). This
provided a convenient opportunity for interest groups to express second thoughts and suggested
modifications of the EEP. The National Association of Wheat Growers, as well as
representatives of other commodities using the program, were totally supportive of continuation
of the EEP without substantial change. Concerns that had been expressed in the 1985 House
hearings about targeting as opposed to a generally available subsidy disappeared. Grain users
might have been expected to be more critical, but more of them supported EEP in 1990 than had
in 1985. The American Bakers Association, the Biscuit and Cracker Manufacturers' Association,
and the North American Export Grain association all testified in favor of continuing the program.
Grain exporters asked for changes in the procedures by which export bonuses are awarded,
which would give the companies greater flexibility in making deals with importers (U.S. Senate,
1991, Part XIII). This however was the one area where concerns had been expressed by nonfarm
and some farm groups —thatthe program was too friendly to exporting companies and that
these companies rather than farmers were profiting from the program. This concern persists to
the present, as exemplified in the recent New York Times series on "Tainted Trade," the first
installment of which was headlined on p. I: "Abuses Plague Programs to Help Exports of
Agricultural Products"(New YorkTimes, October 10, 1993). None of the particular abuses
cited —andsubstantively there were not many —involvedthe wheat EEP program. in
29The two main abuses were tobacco export assistance (not under EEP) that subsidized
exports by U.S. tobacco companies of foreign grown leaf, and corruption (Iraq allegedly using
ostensibly grain import credit to buy arms) in the sale of rice to Iraq in the period leading up to
62addition, economists have continued to assert, based on arguments and analysis discussed earlier,
that the EEP generated few benefits to farmers for its costs.
Because of firm support from commodity and agribusiness groups, and weak opposition,
the EEP emerged unchanged in structure and strengthened in budget in the 1990 Farm Act. EEP
spending was far higher in FY9I-93 than in any previous 3-year period (Table 5). The solid
political support was attributable not so much to particular export achievements of the EEP, but
to farmers' general satisfaction with the recovery of farm income from mid-l980s lows and the
role of the commodity programs in that recovery. CCCwheatinventories had been sold off,
deficiency payments protected producers from low prices in 1986, the export market had
recovered with the dollar's decline from its 1985 high, and reduced output boosted wheat prices
back to 1980-81 level in 1989 and 1990. Farm interests in the 1990 farm bill debate were
devoted mainly to attempting to forestall the budget cuts of about $2 billion annually that the
Bush Administration was calling for. The EEP was thus seen as a piece of a set of programs that
was working. Beyond general satisfaction with the situation,3° a principal threat to U.S. grain
producers was seen to be EC subsidized exports. The EEP was seen as particularly valuable in
this situation, with the Uruguay Round languishing.
Opposition to EEP was mitigated because farm bill reformers focused on other policies.
The only organized reform effort, by a coalition of conservative Republicans and urban
the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
301t may be thought that farmers' positive attitude is being overstated in view of the
complaints of many farm witnesses and the gloomleading of many Agriculture Committee
members. Evidence that this was aimed at forestalling cuts rather than changing programs is the
absence of major proposed changes in the 1990 debate. Recall too that President Bush won the
farm vote in 1992 (see Cook, Art, and Evans).
63Democrats in the House of Representatives, brought to the floor of the House amendments to
reduceoreliminate the sugar, wool, and honey programs, and eliminate deficiency payments to
farms withover a milliondollars in salesorto farmers who earned more than $100,000fromoff-
farm sources. These amendments all failed. These had more apparent popular appeal than an
anti-EEP amendment would have; this helps explain why none was offered.
A second important factor mitigating opposition to EEP was its being scored as budget
neutral. The reforms that were successful in the 1990 Farm Act, most notably the introduction
of a 15 percent reduction in deficiency payments by making 15 percent of each producer's base
acreage ineligible for payments, was driven by the budget reconciliation agreement to cut $13
billion from farm program spending over the five fiscal years 1992-96. The $1 billion annual
spending on EEP would have been a prime target for cuts if the program had not been scored as
budget-neutral by 0MB.
Since passage of the 1990 Farm Act the EEP has become politically still stronger and
further entrenched. Recently EEP sales have been extended to Mexico. The GATT triggers have
locked a minimum of $1 billion annually into EEP bonuses. The Canadian government has
objected to this program on several occasions. When President Bush was planning his visit to
Australia in 1991, the White House found to their surprise that the lead item for discussion
between the heads of state, in the Australian view, was U.S. wheat exports under the EEP.
The desired route to demise of the BEP would be a successful conclusion of the Uruguay
Round with agriculture included along the lines of the "Blair House" agreement reached between
the U.S. and BC in December 1992. One of the few substantive changes in U.S. policy that Blair
House requires is a phase-down of the EEP. In the end, this program could be considered a
64success in the same vein as President Reagans arms buildup in promotingnuclearweapons
agreementswith the USSR. Even ifnoUruguay Round agreementonagricultureisreached it
still noteworthy that theEC has in 199 1-93 inuoduced significant reforms of the Common
Agricultural Policy, including acreage set-aside and other measures to reduce outlays ontheir
export subsidies. The strength of U.S. willingnesstospend on EEP quite likely had a role in
encouraging these reforms, though how important a factor is unclear.3'
Conclusions
A summary of interest group positions on the EEP, and how they fared, is shown in Table
7. The most active group, wheat producers, were substantial economic gainers from the program.
Wheat exporting businesses were less active but were also supportive of EEP, and were winners.
Other agricultural producers, notably feed grains, gained by obtaining a piece of the EEP action
and also supported the program.The losing groups—domestic grain processors and
consumers—did not visibly oppose the program.
itWhat is the U.S. gain from CAP reform? Although it is even more conjectural than the
earlier calculations, CAP reform along the lines being implemented could well reduce EC wheat
exports by 3 to 4 million tons annually, and raise the U.S. market price by20 to 30 cents per
bushel. The resulting gain for U.S. producers would be $120 to $180 million annually, and the
gains to taxpayers would be $350 to $520 million (because of less deficiency payments).U.S.
consumers would lose $240 to $360 million. The overall net gain to the United States, equal
roughly to the price increase times wheat exports, would be $230 to $350 million.
Suppose the EEP accelerated CAP reform by five years. Then the EEP generated$1.1
to $1.8 billion for the United States. The overall U.S. cost of the EEP in 1990-92, using amid-
point value from table 3, was $510 million annually, or about $2 to $3 billion for1986-1993.
These calculations are of course crude, but they indicate that it is quite difficult to obtain any net
U.S. gain from EEP as a strategic investment, even under the assumption that it successfully
induced policy changes in the EC.
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*Millerswere not all losers because subsidies are paid for some flour as well as wheat exports.
**Principallyoped columnists and other authors.
66The most striking feature of the political economy of the Export Enhancement Program is how
little impact standard economic arguments have had. Economists have produced many analyses
showing that the program, even as a second-best measure, generates a net loss to the U.S.
economy, although some have muddied the waters by showing that a precisely calibrated system
of country-specific export subsidy rates could be welfare-increasing if the U.S. has varying
degrees of monopoly power in different wheat import markets (e.g., Abbot, Paarlberg, arid
Sharples, 1987). The lack of clout of the overall U.S. welfare argument is not surprising given
the prevalence of government activity that generates deadweight losses in order to redistribute
income.
It is perhaps more surprising that fact-based analyses that argued farmers as well as the
rest of the economy would be better off under alternative policies did not cut more ice politically
(e.g., Paarlberg, 1988). It seems clear in retrospect that for such an argument to be effective it
has to be accepted by farmers themselves as well as by disinterested observers. The Agriculture
Committees take their cue first and foremost from farmers, and if farmers are united only very
strong opposition can be effective.
In order for wheat growers to abandon EEP, they would have to be shown how they could
be made just as well off with alternative policies that are politically feasible. The option of
cutting acreage with an increased ARP causes farm income to be lower for a given price of wheat
because of the opportunity cost of idled acres. Political feasibility also means avoiding the one
nonfarm source of strong opposition, objection to increased budget outlays. This rules out the
standard approach that economists offer, nondistorting or less distorting transfer payments. With
acreage and yield bases fixed, and farmers free to plant alternative program crops without
67affecting their payments, increasing the wheat target price would provide payments not far from
being a nondistorting transfer (apart from the marginal cost of raising government funds). But
budgetary pressure makes this a non-starter.
The biggestlosersfrom the Export Enhancement Program are buyers of wheat, with losses
of $250 to $600 million per year according to estimates presented earlier, with recent world price
data suggesting the lower end of the range is more likely. But no buyers of wheat —millers,
bakers, livestock producers, or consumers of retail products containing wheat —haveraised
politically significant objections to the program. Agribusiness interests probably did not bear any
losses. Livestock feeders' costs have not been substantial, and a feeling of solidarity along with
logrolling keeps them from opposing the program.32 Consumer costs are only about $1 to 3 per
year per person: and the general public remains generally supportive of farmers according to
polls.
In short, the Export Enhancement Program has proved a political winner because:
—wheatproducers see a benefit from it
—wheatproducers have a unified view on the issue, and they have effective channels
of influence through the Congressional Agriculture committees
—wheatbuyers have not opposed the program
—theprogram has been accepted as budget neutral
32Livestock producers do not have price support programs but logrouing can occur because
cattle feedlots get lower priced feeder calves when grazing costs are lower, so cattle interests
need crop producers' support on keeping Federal grazing fees low; and poultry products have
been exported under EEP using CCC grain as a source of bonuses, so the poultry industry has
an interest in the EEP.
68There are two points of vulnerability for the Export Enhancement Program in the near
future. The first is in the budgetary arena. Budget neutrality arguments are becoming less
plausible now that CCC stocks are no longer used as bonuses, and apparent effects on U.S. prices
are small. The second point is that a GATF agreement in agriculture along the lines of the Blair
House Agreement between the U.S. and EC would require a reduction of EEP. This places EEP
reform as part of a policy package that would make U.S. farmers as well as nonfarmers better
off than at present.
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